Similar countries often choose very di¤erent policies and specialize in very distinct industries. This paper proposes a mechanism to explain policy diversity among similar countries from an open economy perspective. I study optimal policies in a two country model when policies a¤ect determinants of trade patterns. I show that welfare gains from trade can provide su¢ cient incentive for asymmetric equilibrium policies, even if the two countries have identical economic fundamentals. Any asymmetric equilibrium exhibits greater production specialization than the autarky optimum; this is the source of welfare gains. For this same reason, a more asymmetric Nash equilibrium Pareto dominates a less asymmetric one. All equilibria are asymmetric if aggregate income is su¢ ciently convex in policy, under suitable restrictions on technology and preferences. As an application, I consider a model where skill distribution is the determinant of trade patterns and the policy in question is education policy. When heterogeneous agents choose their skill level optimally, optimal skill function is convex in government policy. In this application, symmetry-breaking in optimal education policy requires that the education cost of agents is relatively inelastic with respect to skill. (JEL Classi…cation: F11, E62.) 
Introduction
Why do similar countries choose very di¤erent domestic policies? 1 Existing theories (Benabou and Tirole (2006) , Alesina and Angeletos (2005) ) explain this by modeling the optimal policy problem in a closed economy setting. They rely on coordination failure as the cause for policy diversity. However, studying each country separately, coordination failure can not rule out similarity of equilibrium policies as an equally plausible outcome. This is why Matsuyama (2002) notes, "coordination failure o¤ers no compelling reason"why we should expect to observe diversity across space, time, or groups.
Instead, Matsuyama (2002 Matsuyama ( , 2004 proposes symmetry-breaking as an explanation of observed diversity. The logic of symmetry-breaking relies on modelling interdependence between the relevant space, time, or groups. In the symmetric strategic setup of Matsuyama (2002 Matsuyama ( , 2004 , symmetrybreaking happens when asymmetry is the only stable equilibrium outcome.
In this paper, I apply the logic of symmetry-breaking to explain why similar countries may choose di¤erent domestic policies in equilibrium. I model the policy problem in an open economy where two symmetric countries choose a domestic policy that a¤ects their comparative advantage.
I show that equilibrium policy diversity arises because it allows countries to gain from international specialization and trade. 2 However, in the optimal policy problem any symmetric equilibrium is also stable. Thus, I follow Amir, Garcia, and Knau¤ (2010) in ruling out existence of any symmetric equilibrium to ensure equilibrium policy diversity.
What kind of policies may a¤ect international comparative advantage? International trade literature predicts pattern of trade on the basis of di¤erences in domestic factor endowments (HeckscherOhlin) , skill distribution (Grossman and Maggi (2000) , Bougheas and Riezman (2007) ), sectorspeci…c technologies (Ricardo) or institutions (Costinot (2009) , Levchenko (2007) ). Typically, these di¤erences are treated as entirely exogenous. 3 However, these determinants of trade pattern are a¤ected by choice of domestic education policy, national policies on savings and capital accumulation, sector-speci…c R&D policies, and labor-market policies or credit market reforms. 4 2 Similar countries specialize in distinct industries in the open economy. This observation is the key motivation behind Grossman and Maggi (2000) . Baumol and Gomory (2000) document that for the largest economies ( Germany, Japan, and US) cross-industry pattern of specialization is remarkably stable. 3 Notable exceptions are Findlay (1991, 1992) and Deardor¤ (1997) . 4 In fact, policymakers in many countries emphasize international comparative advantage they derive from domestic policies in an increasingly integrated world. For example, international competitiveness of the knowledge-intensive service sector is an important factor in formulating education policies in service-exporting nations, like India or Ireland. The Indian task force report on Human Resource Development in Information Technology (2000) makes 47 speci…c recommendations with a view "to create a sustainable competitive advantage" in the knowledge-led businesses. A very similar picture of the education policy of Ireland emerges from the Human Capital Priority program of Ireland's National Development Plan (2007) . motive of domestic policy.
To formulate a policy that enhances comparative advantage, policy makers of a country need to take into consideration relevant policies of its trade partners.Thus, as opposed to each country choosing in isolation what policy is best for itself, countries interact in the open economy in their optimal design of national policies that a¤ect international comparative advantage.
My general setup consists of a two-good, two-factor, two-country model in which both good and factor markets are perfectly competitive. The planner in each country chooses a single policy that a¤ects productivity di¤erently for di¤erent goods. For example, the policy in question affects relative technological progress across sectors or factor composition of a country. Because the countries are otherwise identical, a di¤erence in government policy is the only potential source of comparative advantage.
I model the optimal policy problem as a non-cooperative optimization in which each country chooses a policy to maximize aggregate welfare. The optimal policy problem in this setting is a symmetric submodular game. Can these symmetric countries choose asymmetric policies in a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) ? I show that the countries face a clear trade-o¤. An asymmetric policy choice gives rise to endogenous comparative advantage and gains from trade. But it also means that at least one of the identical countries is choosing a policy that would be suboptimal in the absence of trade opportunities. Thus the gains from trade needs to be weighed against the loss in welfare due to a suboptimal domestic policy. Naturally, an asymmetric equilibrium exists if the gains from trade are large enough.
In fact, if an asymmetric equilibrium exists, it is associated with higher aggregate welfare for both countries compared to the common autarky optimum. In an asymmetric equilibrium exante identical countries are ex-post di¤erent with endogenous comparative advantage in di¤erent industries. This leads to the welfare gains in asymmetric equilibrium. More generally, a more asymmetric PSNE Pareto dominates a less asymmetric PSNE.
But when are the gains from trade due to asymmetric policy choice large enough to ensure symmetry-breaking in optimal policy? In the optimal policy problem, a symmetric equilibrium is always stable. Thus, condition for symmetry-breaking of Matsuyama (2002) does not apply in this setting. I rely on quasiconvexity in the welfare function a la Amir, Garcia, Knau¤ (2010) for ruling out symmetric equilibrium. 5 This quasiconvexity in welfare arises due to social increasing return to policy, viz. convexity in aggregate income with respect to policy. I show that su¢ ciently large social increasing returns to policy can give rise to large gains from trade and ensure existence of asymmetric equilibrium.
Interestingly, the social increasing returns to policy arises despite a constant returns scale in production. The key to understanding this is the concept of envelop production possibility frontier.
Constant returns to scale technologies imply that for any given policy, the production possibility set is a convex set. By varying the policy, I can de…ne a production possibility set of an economy as an upper envelope of various production possibility sets, each corresponding to a di¤erent policy choice.
The upper envelope of di¤erent convex sets is not necessarily a convex set. This nonconvexity in the envelope production possibility set implies quasiconvexity in the welfare function which is crucial for symmetry-breaking in optimal policy. 6 In this framework nonconvexity of production possibility set arises due to in ‡uence of government policy on the supply side of the economy. I illustrate existence of social increasing returns to policy in a speci…c application to education policy.
In the application, the social planner allocates a …xed education budget between two categories of education. 7 The agents are endowed with heterogeneous ability. They choose skill enrolling in one of the two education categories and incur an education cost speci…c to that category. The total and marginal cost of education increase in skill and decrease in ability. The education choice is intermediated by government education policy. Apart from the endogenous skill choice by agents and education policy choice by the government, the model is standard Heckscher-Ohlin economy.
I show that endogenous skill choice of agents imply an increasing returns to education policy.
The degree of the social increasing returns is governed by the elasticity of education cost in skill.
Previous literature on education policy (Benabou (2002) ) identi…es this elasticity as the determinant of progressiveness of education system. This elasticity is the key institutional parameter for symmetry breaking in this application, provided technologies of the two sectors are su¢ ciently di¤erent and consumer preference is reasonably diversi…ed.
To summarize, this paper makes three contributions. advantage is endogenous to domestic policy, gains from trade can be an explanation of equilibrium policy diversity among similar countries. Second, I exploit properties of a standard general equilibrium model of international trade to characterize the conditions for and welfare-implications of asymmetric equilibrium in a symmetric optimal policy problem. I show that conditions of symmetry-breaking relying on payo¤ nonconcavities in a submodular game (Amir, Garcia, and Knau¤(2010) ) is related to nonconvexity in the envelop production possibility set (Baumol and Bradford (1972) ) or the related concept of social increasing return to policy. I also establish that greater equilibrium asymmetry gives rise to larger welfare gains. Third, I contribute to the trade and education policy literature (Chang and Huang (2012) , Bougheas, Kneller and Riezman (2009)) by showing endogenous skill choice by agents, in presence of simple, linear education subsidies, can be a source of social increasing returns to policy and symmetry-breaking in optimal policy.
In the context of this application to education policy, I brie ‡y discuss three extensions. First, 6 Similar concept of nonconvex social production possibility set has been studied in general equilibrium models of trade in presence of environmental externality ( see for example, Copeland and Taylor (1999) and Baumol and Bradford (1972) ). Following up on the pioneering work of , national external economies at the industry level is enjoying renewed interest in trade theory literature in models of Bertrand competition with a continuum of industries ( for example, Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2010), Lyn and Rodriguez-Clare (2013)). Here, I restrict attention to a perfectly competitive framework with two industries. 7 Climent and Mukhopadhyay (2013) study implications of a similar budget allocation problem for Indian economy.
I show that in an economy with Grossman and Maggi (2000) production structure, submodularity in production can give rise to social increasing return to education policy and hence equilibrium policy diversity. This resonates with the key result of Chang and Huang (2012) . Using a di¤er-ent speci…cation of education policy in a Grossman-Maggi setup, Chang and Huang (2012) show that Nash equilibrium choice of education systems by two countries interacting strategically are necessarily more divergent than their autarky choices. In the second extension allowing for initial di¤erences among the two countries in the Heckscher-Ohlin framework, I show that in the open economy these countries optimally choose to magnify initial di¤erences by investing relatively more in their respective areas of comparative advantage. 8 However, I illustrate that in order to explain substantial policy diversity among similar countries, social increasing return to policy is still essential. I also brie ‡y discuss the case when in addition to comparative advantage (and aggregate welfare), policy makers also care about redistributive implications of policy choice. 9 The rest of the paper follows a simple organization. In section 2, I present the general framework and the optimal policy problem, and establish the conditions for and welfare implications of symmetry-breaking in optimal policy. I analyze the application to education policy in section 3. I brie ‡y discuss the three extensions in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
Optimal Policy in a General Framework
I consider a two-good, two-factor, perfectly competitive world comprising two identical large economies.
Let F i denote aggregate production of good i and C i denote the aggregate demand of good i. I denote autarky variables by a superscript A and trade variables by a superscript T. All foreign country variables are designated by an asterisk.
Let u(C 1 ; C 2 ) denote the direct utility function, p the relative price of good 1 and Y the aggregate income in the country. Aggregate indirect utility is denoted by V: I assume homothetic preferences which ensure that aggregate demand of each good and indirect utility is linearly homogenous in income,
where
Each government chooses a domestic policy that is the only source of comparative advantage in the open economy. Without loss of generality, let an increase in confer a comparative advantage in good 1. I interpret as a policy that a¤ects sector-speci…c technologies or the relative factor endowments. Government policy a¤ects equilibrium quantities directly through its e¤ects on 8 Similar question regarding optimal education policy and trade has been studied in a small open economy context in Bougheas, Kneller and Riezman (2009), and more recently by Deardro¤ (2013). 9 Derivations and numerical solutions for all the extensions are provided separetely.
economic fundamentals and indirectly through the equilibrium price.
For any given ; one can de…ne the production possibility frontier as the set of maximum output vector (F 1 ; F 2 ) that can be produced using the economy's available technologies and factor inputs.
Let us denote this set as PPF( ). Pro…t maximization by competitive …nal good producers ensure that at any point (F 1 ; F 2 ) on PPF( ) for any and any p, aggregate value of production (pF 1 (p;
) + F 2 (p; )) is maximized such that p equals marginal rate of transformation,
From the equality of aggregate value of production and aggregate income,
Thus, Y (p; ) is same as the national income function in Copeland and Taylor (2003) or revenue function in Dixit and Norman (1980) .
In the competitive equilibrium of the closed economy,
and hence the equilibrium price, p A , depends only on own policy :
In the open economy both countries' policies determine the equilibrium terms-of-trade p T (:) from goods market clearing of the world,
and the foreign policy a¤ects domestic welfare through the terms-of-trade externality. Below I de…ne the competitive equilibrium of the economy for a given policy parameter :
De…nition 1 For any given policy ; the competitive equilibrium is de…ned by a sequence of equilibrium price and quantities fp j ,
) solve the consumer's utility maximization problem in the home country
Similarly, C i (p j ; ) solve the consumer optimization problem in the foreign country.
2. F 1 (p j ; ); F 2 (p j ; ) solve producer's pro…t maximization problem which implies that aggregate income is maximized subject to the technology and factor endowment constraints of the economy max
Similarly, F i (p j ; ) solve the producer optimization problem in the foreign country.
3. Markets clear.
Autarky:
Open economy:
I denote aggregate welfare under autarky by U A ( ) and aggregate welfare under trade as U T ( ; ): By de…nition of indirect utility function,
I assume that U A ( ) and U T ( ; ) are di¤erentiable upto second order: The world welfare is denoted by W (:);
Suppose that policy lies in a bounded policy space The countries are identical in terms of all economic fundamentals. When both countries choose the same policy ( = ), countries are endogenously in autarky. This gives us the …rst insightful property of the welfare function which I use throughout the paper:
A similar property applies to equilibrium price under trade and autarky:
Also, in the open economy the aggregate welfare function satis…es the gains from trade property.
By this property, a country, for any given own policy, can gain in welfare terms by trading with a partner with a di¤erent policy,
with equality at = : From the gains from trade property, for any two arbitrary policies i and j ; the relative welfare of choosing i compared to j ; conditional on the trading partner choosing j ; improves in open economy over that in autarky. 10 In this sense trade favors asymmetry in policy. Below I summarize these properties of the welfare function.
Remark 3 By symmetry of the setup
Remark 4 By gains from trade property of the welfare function
with equality at = :
When autarky optimum policy is not unique, using (7), it is straightforward to show that at least one asymmetric equilibrium exists in both the non cooperative and cooperative optimal policy
problem of the open economy. Hence, I restrict attention to the case where the autarky problem has a unique optimum, e :
When do these symmetric countries choose asymmetric policies in the open economy if the autarky problem has a unique optimum? To answer this question, it is important to understand an important property of asymmetric equilibrium. Suppose that ( 0 ; 0 ) is an asymmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium. By gains from trade (7),
But since 0 is the best response to 0 ;
1 0 From (7), we know that
Thus, at any asymmetric PSNE both countries gain in aggregate welfare compared to the common autarky optimum. Note that this result is independent of the countries experiencing any price
change at the open economy asymmetric equilibrium compared to the autarky optimum. Thus, the welfare gain in the asymmetric equilibrium is due to increase in production specialization, which allows for an expansion of the consumption possibility frontier through trade.
First, I illustrate graphically conditions for equilibrium policy diversity in the light of this welfare-improving nature of asymmetric equilibrium. In Figure 1 for illustration purposes I consider 3 possible policy options 1 < 2 < 3 : The shaded region denotes the envelope PPF. For the set of consumer preferences described in Figure 1 , the autarky optimal policy e is given by 2 :
Good 1
Good 2
Figure 1: Envelope PPF and The Autarky Optimum
In this framework with identical homothetic demand between countries, comparative-advantage in any industry arises from the supply side. Thus, the role of policy in a¤ecting production possibilities of a country is crucial for existence of an asymmetric equilibrium with endogenous comparative advantage in di¤erent industries. In a perfectly competitive world with constant returns to scale technologies, the production set for any given ; PPF( ), is a convex set. However, constant returns to scale technologies do not imply that the production set described by the envelope PPF is a convex set. If the production set described by PPF is a convex set, it is straightforward to prove that an asymmetric PSNE does not exist. 11 But when can ( 1 ; 3 ) be a Pareto-improving asymmetric NE in the open economy? For illustration purposes, I completely shut down the traditional channel of gains from trade due to price 1 1 If the envelop PPF is a convex set, no two production points on the boundary satisfy p=MRT condition. movement from autarky to free trade. Hence, the free trade price at the asymmetric equilibrium is same as the autarky price at e : In Figure 2 , a Pareto-improving asymmetric NE exists since the production possibilities described by the PPF is su¢ ciently nonconvex set. In the open economy a country that chooses 3 > 2 ; does not su¤er a major adverse terms-of-trade movement, since in the open economy equilibrium price is less responsive to any country's policy movements. 12 Thus by specializing in two distinct industries each country observes an expansion in its consumption possibility frontier. This opens the door for welfare gains in an asymmetric equilibrium in the open economy. In contrast, in Figure 3 when the production possibility set does not show enough nonconvexity, no such asymmetric PSNE exists. The …gures o¤er a great tool for illustration. More generally, I consider a bounded policy space to relate conditions for equilibrium asymmetry using non-convexities in the production set to conditions for symmetry-breaking in the literature (Matsuyama (2002) and Amir, Garcia and Knau¤ (2010) ). This allows me to derive properties of the aggregate income function that are crucial for equilibrium policy diversity and to establish welfare properties of asymmetric equilibria.
As before, e denote the unique autarky optimal policy. I focus on the non cooperative optimal policy problem. Each government simultaneously chooses its policy to maximize aggregate welfare. The optimal policy of a country depends on the policy of the trading partner. I restrict attention to the pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE), and assume that an equilibrium exists in the policy game. 13 Welfare properties of di¤erent asymmetric PSNEs follow from a simple generalization of the gains from trade property. Not only a country gains in welfare by trading with a partner who has a di¤erent policy, but a country gains more from trade, given her own policy, more di¤erent is the trading partner. 14 I summarize this property of the welfare function in the following lemma.
Lemma 5 (Greater the Di¤erence, Greater the Gains) For any given own policy, the welfare of a country increases with an increase in the foreign policy, if the foreign policy is greater than the own policy. Thus,
Similarly,
Proof. See Appendix.
This property of the welfare function simply says that given a country's own policy, greater is the di¤erence with the trading partner, greater are the welfare gains. This generic property of comparative-advantage driven trade and the de…nition of NE allow us to rank various asymmetric PSNEs in terms of associated welfare. Consider two asymmetric PSNEs ( 1 ; 1 ) and ( 2 ; 2 ) such that the home country is an exporter of good 1 in both of these equilibria ( i > i ; i = 1; 2). Also, the countries are more di¤erent in the …rst PSNE than in the second one, 1 < 2 < 2 < 1 .
Both countries attain a higher welfare in ( 1 ; 1 ) compared to ( 2 ; 2 ): Hence, an equilibrium with greater asymmetry increases the welfare of both countries. I describe this property in Proposition 6. Proposition 6 provides a welfare-ranking of multiple asymmetric PSNEs on any given side of the diagonal of the strategy space. externality as the only source of strategic interaction, the symmetric equilibrium, if it exists, is stable. Stability of the symmetric equilibrium follows from the substitutability of the two goods in consumption. 15 Amir, Garcia and Knau¤ (2010) rule out any symmetric equilibrium since in their game the payo¤ function does not satisfy the necessary condition for an interior optimum at any interior point of symmetry. In this case by the gains from trade property the welfare function, U T ( ; ); has slope 0 at (e ; e ). 16 Hence the exact su¢ cient condition outlined in Amir, Garcia and Knau¤ (2010) is not satis…ed in my framework. However, similar to Amir, Garcia and Knau¤ (2010), I rely on some form of payo¤ nonconcavity to rule out a symmetric equilibrium in this case.
In this game the unique autarky optimum policy e is also the unique candidate for a symmetric equilibrium. Any unilateral deviation from (e , e ) comes with a gain from a trade component and a loss in autarky utility component. If the home country can pro…tably deviate to a 0 6 = e when the partner is choosing e , only asymmetric PSNEs exist in this game. Existence of such a pro…table deviation implies
Loss in autarky utility
:
Thus the symmetric PSNE at (e ; e ) is ruled out if the gains from trade at the strategy pro…le ( 0 ; e ) exceeds the loss in autarky utility from choosing 0 :
In general, the problem of ruling out any symmetric PSNE is technically equivalent to …nding a global maximum of U T ( ; e ) at a 0 6 = e , even though e is a local maximum. The welfare function in the open economy, U T ( ; e ); is quasi-convex in own policy over some part of the action space for this separation of the global maximum ( 0 ) from the autarky optimum. In fact if U T ( ; ) is strictly quasiconvex in own policy and e is an interior optimum in autarky, there is a unique pair 1 5 See appendix for a proof of stability of any symmetric PSNE. 1 6 The necessary …rst order condition of maximization of U T ( ; e ) is satis…ed at e since by gains from trade and endogenous autarky properties of the welfare function, U T ( ; e ) is an upper envelop of U A ( ) with equality = e ; where e is the critical point of U A ( ):
of asymmetric NE given by the extremes ( ; Proof. See Appendix.
Since convexity in income with respect to policy plays such an important role for ensuring equilibrium asymmetry, I explore this property of the economy in detail in an application. I
show, in an application to education policy in a standard Heckscher-Ohlin model, that such social increasing return in aggregate production may arise in presence of optimal endogenous skill choice of agents even though technologies are constant returns to scale.
An Application to Education Policy
I consider a speci…c application of the abstract general policy problem to education policy. Governments allocate a …xed education budget, …nanced by lumpsum taxation, between higher and primary education.
I consider a simple model of endogenous skill choice by heterogenous agents. In each country there are two types of labor. High types are born with ability h and low types are born with ability l, h > l: There are n L low type workers and n H high type workers. A positively skewed skill distribution implies n L > n H :
Because the game is symmetric, any asymmetric PSNE appears in pairs. When there are only asymmetric PSNEs in this game, the total number of PSNEs is even. In a game with continuum action space, usually there are an odd number of PSNEs by Wilson's Oddness Theorem (1971). This result is based on the degree theory and requires continuity of the best response form. Ruling out symmetric equilibrium in this game involves a robust jump of the best replies across the diagonal of the strategy space as in Amir, Garcia, Knau¤ (2010). Hence, my results are consistent with the Wilson's Oddness Theorem (1971). 1 8 In this setup a symmetric mixed strategy NE always exists, by the Folk Theorem (Dasgupta and Maskin 1986). However, in a game characterized by strategic substitutability, MSNE is usually unstable. Also, in my case countries attain greater welfare in any asymmetric PSNE compared to a symmetric MSNE. Moreover, it is standard in the policy literature to focus on the PSNE as the relevant solution concept.
Each type of worker chooses a skill level incurring cost of education (measured in welfare terms).
Both total and marginal cost of education rise in skill and decrease in ability. Cost of education is a¤ected by allocation of education budget by the government. Let h e denote skill chosen by high type workers and l e denote skill chosen by low type workers. Total e¤ective endowment of high-skilled and low-skilled labor is given by
As before, u denotes the direct utility function,
where is the expenditure share of good 1 and C i is aggregate consumption of good i. Here, C i is given by
where c H i and c L i denote individual consumption of high and low type agents. Good 2 is the numeraire and p is the relative price of good 1. I assume that factor price equalization holds over the entire strategy space at the equilibrium price for the speci…ed set of parameters and functional forms.
High types choose skill, h e and consumption, c H 1 and c H 2 ; to maximize utility
given equilibrium wage, price and educational institutional parameters. Here, w H (w L ) refers to the wage of high-and low-type workers. Low type workers solve a similar optimization problem.
Welfare cost of education is captured by H (
h e h ) . Both total and marginal cost of education rise in the ability h and fall in the skill h e : Note that a fall in t ; t = H; L reduces the cost of education. I de…ne t as the quality of educational institutions. Here, is the elasticity of cost of education with respect to skill. Note that given an ability h, the relative cost of acquiring higher skill h 00 > h 0 ;
; increases in : I de…ne as the progressivity of the education system, following the interpretation in Benabou (2002) . The condition > 1 ensures that the second order condition of optimality of the agents'skill choice is satis…ed.
The optimal skill choice function is given by
where H (= hn H ) and L (= ln L ) denote original endowments of skill in the economy.
Producers maximize pro…t given the equilibrium wage, price and e¤ective endowments of skill:
Producers of the two goods employ high-and low-skilled labor with di¤erent intensities
where i denotes the share of high-skilled labor per unit cost of good i. Good 1 is relatively more intensive in high-skilled labor, 1 > 2:
In equilibrium all the optimization conditions hold and both labor and goods markets clear.
Below I de…ne competitive equilibrium of this economy.
De…nition 8 A competitive equilibrium is de…ned by a sequence {p; w H ; w L ; h e ; l e ; c H i=1;2 ; c L i=1;2 ; h e ; l e ; c H i=1;2 ; c L i=1;2 g s.t.
1. Given goods and factor prices fp; w H ; w L g; high (low) type workers optimally choose h e and c H i=1;2 (l e and c L i=1;2 ) to maximize utility from consumption net of education cost, subject to usual budget constraint in each country.
2. Given goods and factor prices fp; w H ; w L g and e¤ ective endowment of factors (H e ; L e ); producers in sector i choose optimal allocation of factors (H e i ; L e i ) to maximize pro…t in each country.
Markets clear. This imply, in each country
Under autarky
Under trade
The government has a total education budget T = 1; and chooses a fraction 2 [0; 1] to spend on higher education. The remainder goes to primary education. The government expenditure on higher education, ; improves the higher educational institutions,
Similarly, L = g(1 ): 19 For simplicity, I assume that initially higher education and basic education institutions have same quality ( H = L = b > 1); and government policy a¤ects the institutions in a simple linear fashion,
Note that the government always has the option of improving both types of institutions equally ( = :5); but may choose to attach di¤erent priorities to di¤erent institutions. From optimal skill choice function, (8), the condition > 1 ensures that H e is a convex function of ; given p: Thus when agents choose their skill levels optimally, optimal skill function in the economy is convex in government policy, even though government policy a¤ects education costs in a simple linear fashion.
This ensures that necessary condition for symmetry-breaking viz. aggregate income is convex in policy, is satis…ed in this framework.
The government takes the optimal response of the agents and market clearing conditions as given and chooses allocation of the education budget, ; to maximize the aggregate indirect utility.
As before, in the closed economy each government chooses to maximize aggregate welfare, U A ( ):
In the non cooperative optimal policy problem in the open economy, each government maximizes U T ( ; ) taking the other country's policy as given. In the cooperative optimal policy problem in the open economy the social planner maximizes the world welfare, W ( ; ):
Let us de…ne the relative welfare under a policy 0 compared to 00 , given that the foreign country is choosing ; as
Using a similar notation,
stands for the relative welfare under a policy 0 compared to 00 in autarky. For any 0 > 00 ;
(10) increases in and i . Hence, the autarky optimal policy (e ) monotonically increases in the expenditure share of the skill intensive good and in the skill intensities of production. This is intuitive since is the fraction of education budget spent on higher education. For any 0 > 00 ; Proof. See Appendix.
These comparative static properties of (9) help us to understand the comparative static properties of an asymmetric PSNE. For any 0 > 00 (9) is increasing in both and 1 . For given 1 ; let 0 be the minimum value of such that 0 > e is a pro…table unilateral deviation from (e ; e ).
An increase in 1 increases r T ( 0 ; e ; e ) and ensures that 0 is a pro…table unilateral deviation from is the high-skill intensity in the production of good 1, and is the expenditure-share of the more skill-intensive good 1. Thus, given a su¢ ciently large social increasing return, only asymmetric
PSNEs exist if consumer preferences and production technologies are not biased towards the same factor of production.
The following proposition summarizes the condition for equilibrium policy diversity in the open economy. Note that in this model,
where s t (p); t = H; L; are given from (8) . Given > 1; a fall in increases the convexity of (11) provided b 1. Hence, if is su¢ ciently low, ( 1 2 ) is su¢ ciently high and consumers do not prefer either of the goods too strongly, an asymmetric PSNE exists.
Proposition 10
If is su¢ ciently low and b 1, ( 1 2 ) is su¢ ciently high and consumers do not prefer either of the goods very strongly, an asymmetric PSNE exists in the open economy optimal policy problem.
Discussion
The application to education policy in the previous section provides a setting where aggregate income is convex in government policy. This leads to asymmetric equilibrium policy choice for symmetric countries to encourage trade. In presence of standard constant returns to scale technology in a Heckscher-Ohlin set up, this social increasing return to policy arises due to endogenous skill choice of agents. I consider an alternative speci…cation which shares the production structure of Grossman and Maggi (2000) , but has a similar speci…cation of consumer preferences and government policy. For simplicity I assume allocation of education budget by the government a¤ects e¤ective endowment of skill directly. The submodular production technology implies that even when government policy a¤ects skills in a linear fashion, aggregate production and income can be su¢ ciently convex in policy and this gives rise to symmetry-breaking in optimal education policy in the open economy. 20 This symmetry-breaking result resonates with the key result of Chang and Huang (2012) . Using a novel speci…cation of education policy in a Grossman-Maggi setup, Chang and Huang (2012) show that Nash equilibrium choice of education systems by two countries interacting strategically are necessarily more divergent than their autarky choices. Chang and Huang (2012) A natural way to introduce initial di¤erences is to consider countries that have di¤erent initial factor endowments. In this setting if the government policy is su¢ ciently e¤ective in increasing skill, countries optimally amplify initial sources of comparative advantage in the open economy equilibrium. In such a PSNE both countries attain larger aggregate welfare compared to their respective autarky optima. 21 2 0 Note that the intuition for this result is quite general. To see this, let us consider the general framework in section 2. In the general framework say $ is the original determinant of trade and is the relevant policy,
plays the crucial role for existence of asymmetric equilibrium. But note that
In the presence of submodularity in production essentially
> 0; and hence
is not required for the convexity in production. 2 1 However, for the relatively skill abundant country, an increase in the higher education investment leads to a terms-of-trade deterioration. When these terms-of-trade considerations are very important, an ine¢ cient symmetric non cooperative outcome may exist. In such a symmetric PSNE, the world welfare improves if each country invests more in their areas of comparative advantage. This possible ine¢ ciency of the PSNE raises the same concern of international policy cooperation as in the familiar case of tari¤/tax policies ( see for example, Deardor¤ (1997) ). The di¤erence is that in this case the countries should focus in their relative areas of comparative advantage to attain a Thus, if countries are initially di¤erent, social increasing return is no longer necessary for ampli…cation of initial comparative advantage in the open economy optimal policy outcome. However, I Illustrate in a series of numerical simulation, in absence of such increasing return to policy one can explain signi…cant policy di¤erences among countries via welfare gains from trade only if the countries are originally signi…cantly di¤erent. To explain signi…cant policy diversity among similar countries, one would still need to rely on presence of an increasing return to policy.
A natural extension of the pure welfare maximizing optimal policy problem is to allow governments to also care for redistributive equity. In the general framework it is straightforward to show that symmetric autarky equilibrium continues to remain the only candidate for a symmetric Pareto optimum. Even in presence of redistributive concerns, quasiconvexity in the welfare function and convexity in aggregate income remain important for existence of an asymmetric equilibrium. 22 In the presence of political concerns it is no longer true that both countries attain higher social welfare at an asymmetric PSNE compared to any symmetric PSNE. 23 Also, allowing for endogenous comparative advantage in a political economy framework, political preferences of the government can be a source of comparative advantage in the open economy.
Conclusion
In this paper I show that similar countries may choose di¤erent policies because these policies allow them to specialize in di¤erent industries and gain from international trade. I …nd that even identical countries may optimally choose di¤erent policies in an open economy, and both of these symmetric countries gain in aggregate welfare in any asymmetric equilibrium compared to the autarky optimum. In an application in the competitive economy an asymmetric equilibrium arises if education policy a¤ects the determinants of trade, namely e¤ective endowments of skill, in a strong convex fashion. I construct a model where agents optimally choose their skill levels given government policy, and show that optimal skill is a convex function of government policy. I also study countries that are similar but not identical and …nd that these countries may optimally choose to invest more in their respective areas of comparative advantage to magnify initial di¤erences. This paper outlines a general mechanism that applies to many di¤erent policies which can potentially a¤ect comparative advantage in the open economy. For any particular application, it is important to model the domestic economic environment more carefully. For example, education policy is an important policy in encouraging trade, but there are several reasons why education Pareto improvement. When comparative advantage is at least partly endogenous to national policy, an international policy coordination requires the countries to agree to disagree. 2 2 Note that if the production possibility set described by the envelope PPF is a convex set, an asymmetric equilibrium does not exist under free trade, independent of the nature of government preferences. 2 3 For example, if social welfare di¤ers from aggregate welfare due to a political concern for increases in inequality, it is possible that one of the countries prefer a symmetric PSNE over an asymmetric PSNE because of the increase in inequality under trade. Using numerical simulation in the simple Hecksher-Ohlin economy I illustrate how the gain in social welfare in the asymmetric PSNE varies with changes in economic fundamentals. Also, I demonstrate numerically the parameter space for which an asymmetric equilibrium exists and how key convexity parameters a¤ect the optimal policy outcome. Details are available upon request.
policy is important for the domestic economy itself. Since future human capital is typically not accepted as collateral, availability of credit for …nancing educational expenditure is limited. This aspect of the education policy has received attention in both trade and macro policy literature (Benabou (2002) , Ranjan (2000) , Chesnokova and Krishna (2008) ). Also, skills learnt in the earlier stages of academic development are complementary in acquiring advanced skills. In future work I intend to incorporate these aspects of education in a more complete application to study the interplay between the domestic and the international motives of optimal policy, and to study the implications for inequality. 
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Appendix
Derivation and Proofs for Section 2
From homothetic demand aggregate demand for good i C i is linearly homogenous in income,
Here Y is aggregate income,
where F i stands for aggregate production of good i. The aggregate indirect utility is given by,
The marginal e¤ect of p on indirect utility is given by,
(p dF 1 dp + dF 2 dp ):
From (12),
Hence from (4), @V @p = 0 in autarky. Assume that the policy instrument provides absolute advantage in good 1 and absolute disadvantage in good 2. Since total value of consumption equals income,
Proof of Lemma 5. Since a¤ects welfare of the home country through terms-of-trade,
From Roy's identity,
Since an increase in confer comparative advantage in good 1,
Suppose > ; which implies that the home country is an importer of good 1,
Similarly, < implies Proof of Proposition 6. Given 1 < 2 < 2 and
But,
since 1 is the best response to 1 : Similarly, given 2 < 2 < 1 and
But 1 is the best response to 1 ; which implies
Proof of Proposition 7. I prove this proposition in three steps.
Step 1: Properties of Cooperative Welfare Maximization: A symmetric strategy pro…le in which both countries choose the autarky optimum, (e ; e ); is the only candidate for a symmetric Pareto optimum. If e lies in the interior of the policy space and W ( ; ) is quasiconvex in ( ; ) at (e ; e ), all the Pareto optima are asymmetric:
Proof. The result that (e ; e ) is the only candidate for a symmetric Pareto optimum follows directly from the symmetry of the setup which ensures W ( ; ) = 2U A ( ); and optimality of e :
If e is an interior autarky optimum, …rst order condition (FOC) of maximization must be satis…ed at e : From the de…nition of U A (:);
which equals zero from (4). Therefore,
Similarly from the de…nition of W (:) and using (5),
Therefore, the FOC of optimization of the world welfare is satis…ed at (e ; e ). If W ( ; ) is quasiconvex in ( ; ) at (e ; e ); every Pareto optimum is asymmetric since (e ; e ) is the unique candidate for symmetric Pareto optimum.
Step 2: Properties of Non-cooperative Welfare Maximization: A symmetric strategy pro…le in which both countries choose the autarky optimum, (e ; e ); is the only candidate for a symmetric PSNE. Suppose that e is an interior optimum. If W ( ; ) is strictly quasiconcave, an asymmetric PSNE does not exist. If U T ( ; ) is strictly quasiconvex in own strategy, there is a unique pair of asymmetric NE given by the extremes ( ; ).and ( ; ):
Proof. Suppose that (b ; b ), b 6 = e is a PSNE. The home country attains a payo¤ of U T (e ; b ) by deviating to e ; given that the foreign country is choosing b : The resulting change in payo¤ From the de…nition of strict quasiconvexity,
Let 1 = ( ; ) and 2 = ( ; ): Any 0 2 ( ; ) yields a lower pay o¤ than 0 = or 0 = ; for any given foreign policy 2 [ ; ]: Hence, 8 2 [ ; ]; the best response is either or : Neither nor is an autarky optimum. Therefore, ( ) is not the best response to ( ): Thus, the best response to is and vice versa. The only two PSNEs are ( ; ) and ( ; ).
Step 3: Relation between quasiconvexity of welfare function and social increas-
j (e ;e ) is positive and su¢ ciently large, U T ( ; ) is quasiconvex at (e ; e ) even though U A ( ) is quasiconcave at e :
Proof. The su¢ cient condition for equilibrium asymmetry in step 2 requires a quasiconvex U T ( ; ); even though e is an interior autarky optimum. Let us consider the di¤erence between the curvatures of U T ( ; ) at (e ; e ) and U A ( ) at e : Note that the curvature of U A ( ) is given by,
First, we show that (12) and (13) .
Indirect utility is decreasing in p given Y,
Since gives absolute advantage in good 1 and absolute disadvantage in good 2;
Hence,
: Note that,
Thus the sign of
, in general, is ambiguous and
is given by,
The …rst principal minor of the Hessian of U T ( ; ) has a similar expression as (14) given by,
At a point of symmetry,
j (e ;e ) is su¢ ciently low,
> 0 and su¢ ciently high, it is possible that (14) is negative, while (15) is positive. The second principal minor of the Hessian of U T ( ; ) at a point of symmetry is given by,
Hence, su¢ ciently high values of
also ensures that the second principal minor of the Hessian of U T ( ; ) is positive. Thus su¢ cient convexity in production with respect to the policy in question ensures that there are only asymmetric equilibria in the open economy, even though e is an interior autarky optimum.
Convexity in production also plays a crucial role to satisfy the necessary condition for existence of an asymmetric equilibrium. To see this, suppose that production of goods is linear in policy,
This ensures that the second principal minor of the Hessian of U T ( ; ) is zero, and the …rst principal minor is negative. Hence, the Hessian of U T ( ; ) is negative semide…nite, and U T ( ; ) is strictly quasiconcave. Hence, if
= 0 there is no asymmetric equilibrium in the open economy.
Steps 1, 2 and 3 combined complete the proof of proposition 7.
Remark 11 Every symmetric equilibrium ( ; ) is stable.
Proof. We need to show that j
This implies that the best response has absolute slope less than unity at any symmetric equilibrium. Note that,
is given by, 
is the unique stable equilibrium.
Derivation and Proofs for Section 3
The aggregate indirect utility is a function of the equilibrium price and the aggregate income,
Aggregate income, Y (p; ); is given by w
Here c, c h ; c l ; and c p denote constants that depend on the economic fundamentals.
Let us …rst derive (8) . A more able agent with initial ability h chooses h e by maximizing
where w H (p) = c h p 1 2 1 2 : From the FOC, one can derive
Multiplying both sides by n H I arrive at (8) . The second order condition of optimality requires > 1: Similarly one can solve the optimal skill-choice problem of the low-skilled agents.
Note that,
We can rewrite
An increase in the government spending increases the e¤ective endowment, g 0
where g 0 L (1 ) > 0: A H and A L are constants that depend on all the parameters and price, p:
Impose parameter restrictions such that H e 1 H and L e 1 L for any choice of policy.
In the competitive equilibrium of the closed economy only domestic policy determines the equilibrium price,
and in the open economy both domestic and foreign policy determine the equilibrium terms-oftrade,
L e + L e ) 2 1 c p ( ; 1 ; 2 ):
The equilibrium price in the open economy is given by, 
where a = 2 + ( 1 2 ); qf = ((1 )f 1 + f 2 )=( f 2 ( 1 =(1 1 )) + (1 )f 1 ( 2 =(1 2 )); f = (((1 1 )=(1 2 ))( 2 =(1 2 )) 2 ( 1 =(1 1 )) 1 ) 1=( 2 1 ) ; f 2 = ( 2 =(1 2 )) 2 f 2 1 =( 1 =(1 1 ) 2 =(1 2 )); f 1 = ( 1 =(1 1 )) 1 f 1 1 =( 1 =(1 1 ) 2 =(1 2 )); and g = (1 1 )( 1 =(1 1 )) 1 f 1 are constants depending on the production and demand parameters.
Proof of Lemma 9. Consider a pair of policies ( 1 ; 2 ) such that 1 > 2 . Relative welfare of higher education, (10) , is given by, r A ( 1 ; 2 ) = (
Evidently given g 0 t > 0, (10) increases in the demand share of the skill intensive good ( ) and in the skill intensities of production,
Given the rest of the parameters, consider an increase in 0 to 00 : Let the original autarky optimal policy be e 0 and the new autarky optimal policy be e 00 . Since e 0 is the original autarky optimal,
With increase in ; r A (e 0 ; ) increases r < e 0 . Thus,
Hence, e 00 1 e 0 : This implies that the autarky optimal policy (e ) is increasing in ; i :
The relative welfare of higher education in the open economy, (9) , is given by,
(g L (1 1 )(1 + ) + (1 )
where U T L is the aggregate indirect utility of the low-skilled workers and S T L stands for 
and
increases in ; if 1 > 2 and g 0 t > 0: A similar proof works for increase in 1 : Hence using a similar logic as before, BR( ) shifts up in and 1 :
Proof of Proposition 10.
Step 1: If g 00 t (:) is su¢ ciently high, skill intensities of production are su¢ ciently di¤erent and consumers do not prefer either of the two goods too strongly, only asymmetric PSNEs and hence, only asymmetric Pareto optima exist. From the derivation in appendix 6.1 U T ( ; ) is quasiconvex in ; if
is su¢ ciently high.
Hence, if g 00 t (:) is su¢ ciently high, U T ( ; ) is quasiconvex in : Now there are two possible cases. Case 1: If g 00 l (:) is such that both U A and U T is quasiconvex, only asymmetric equilibria exist if preference for higher in the competitive economy is not very high. De…ne e such that the autarky optimum is 0 for e ; and the autarky optimum is for 1 e : Also, de…ne such that r T ( ; ; ) = 1 at the : By the gains from trade property (7), r T ( 0 ; ; ) lies above r A ( 0 ; ) for any : Hence, is strictly less than e : Thus, for 2 [ ; e ] there is only asymmetric PSNE. Similarly I can de…ne such that r T ( ; ; ) = 1 at the ; and for 2 [ e ; ] there is only asymmetric PSNE.
It is straightforward to show that, < : To have a non empty interval of [ , ] v [0; 1]; we need to check rest of the parameters of the economy. The su¢ cient condition for 1 0 is
For a given g L (0) > 0; this condition depends only on 2 and is more likely to be satis…ed for a fall in 2 : A fall in 2 makes the low-skill intensive good even more intensive in lower skill and hence in primary education. This increase in low-skill intensity of production for good 2 makes it more likely that investing only in primary education is the symmetric equilibrium for non-negative values of . In a similar vein, 1 essentially means that for some values of the preference parameter investing only in higher education is the symmetric equilibrium. For a given g H (0) > 0;
this su¢ cient condition depends only on 1 and is more likely to be satis…ed for an increase in 1 :
Thus higher is the di¤erence in the skill intensities of production of the two goods, more likely is the existence of a non empty subset of the parameter space for the preference parameter [ ; ] [0; 1]
for which an asymmetric PSNE exists.
Case 2: If g 00 t (:) is su¢ ciently high such that U T is quasiconvex at (e ; e ), by Proposition 7 there is only asymmetric PSNEs at the extremes provided there is a interior e : Since (10) 
